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Abstract  
Consumption tax rates targeted at specific sectors are often reformed without 
empirical knowledge about the efficiency of these policies. This paper sheds light 
on the efficiency issue, the potential for welfare improving reform, by studying 
the incidence of value added taxes (VAT) on prices and quantities of barber 
services traded. I also study the incidence on the profits made by the targeted 
firms. I utilize a VAT reform targeted at a specific service sector which creates a 
natural experiment set up. VAT for hairdressing services in Finland was reduced 
from 22% to 8%, whereas the normal tax treatment still applied to beauty salons 
and other labor intensive services. The choice of the treatment and control groups 
was exogenous to circumstances in Finland, since these groups were selected in a 
more wider European setting. The results suggest that hairdressers cut their 
prices only by half of what complete pass-through would have implied, and that 
there was hardly any adjustment in the equilibrium quantity due to the reform. 
Instead of lowering prices, most hairdressers were able to increase their profits. 
There is important heterogeneity in the results according to firm size. 
Key words: VAT reform, efficiency, tax incidence 
 
Tiivistelmä  
Kohdennettuja kulutusveroja muutellaan usein ilman empiiristä tietoa 
kulutusveron hyvinvointivaikutuksista. Tässä tutkimuksessa selvitellään kulutus-
verotuksen tehokkuutta tutkimalla miten arvonlisäverot näkyvät kuluttaja-
hinnoissa ja miten nämä verot vaikuttavat kulutettujen hyödykkeiden määrään. 
Tutkimuksessa katsotaan myös miten arvonlisäverot näkyvät yritysten tekemissä 
voitoissa. Suuri arvonlisäverouudistus vuoden 2007 alusta mahdollistaa arvon-
lisäveron vaikutusarvioinnit. Uudistuksessa parturi-kampaamoiden arvonlisä-
veroaste laski 22 prosentista 8 prosenttiin, kun samanaikaisesti muiden läheisten 
toimialojen arvonlisäverotuksessa ei tapahtunut muutoksia. Uudistuksen kohde-
ryhmäksi valittiin juuri parturi-kampaamot, koska EU-direktiivi mahdollisti 
  
 
alennuksen näille ryhmille, mutta ei tutkimuksessa käytetylle kontrolliryhmälle. 
Siten ryhmien valinta ei riippunut suoraan heidän taloudellisesta tilanteestaan. 
Tulosten perusteella parturi-kampaamoiden hinnat laskivat noin puolella siitä, 
mitä täysi arvonlisäveron siirtyminen hintaan implikoisi. Parturi-kampaamo-
palveluiden kysyntä ei näytä veromuutoksen johdosta muuttuneen. Sen sijaan 
parturi-kampaamot kykenivät lisäämään voittojaan kevyemmän kulutus-
verotuksen ansiosta. Tuloksissa on merkittävää eroa yritystyypin mukaan. 
Asiasanat: alv-uudistus, tehokkuus, veron kohtaanto hintoihin 
 
1 Introduction
Economic literature provides sound theoretical insights for an efficient con-
sumption tax system (Crawford et al. 2010). Often efficiency depends on
the extent to which the tax rate affects the quantity of goods traded in equi-
librium. If a good has a relatively small quantity elasticity with respect
to consumption taxes, the optimal result is to set the tax rate relatively
high. The reasoning is that with relatively little effect on quantity the tax
rate distorts the economy only slightly (Ramsey 1927, Diamond and Mirrlees
1971 and Weyl and Fabinger 2013), or does not affect the labor supply of
consumers through correlation between consumption and the labor supply
(Atkinson and Stiglitz 1976). However, the literature offers little convincing
empirical insights about how responsive the equilibrium quantities in differ-
ent sectors are to consumption taxes. The reason for the lack of empirical
evidence is the scarcity of settings that enable causal estimates and the lack
of micro data on relevant variables, like the quantity of goods traded.
This paper studies empirically the incidence of consumption taxation on
prices, quantities and profits. One setting that allows me to estimate the
causal price elasticity of quantity is a VAT reform affecting hairdressing ser-
vices in Finland. The reform reduced the VAT rates on hairdressing services
from 22% to 8%. There are natural control groups for which the VAT rate
did not change: beauty salons, day spas and massage services. In legislation
the line between some of these services is drawn at the eyebrows: hairdress-
ing services apply to head hair and beards and beauty salon services to the
eyebrows. Thus the services in the treatment and control groups resemble
each other, since both are services for the beauty and well being of cus-
tomers. Also, the firms in both groups are small labor intensive businesses
in the same country. Thus the demand for these services and the economic
conditions they face are similar. Moreover, the choice of the treatment group
is exogenous to the behavior of firms, since the treatment group was cho-
sen in an European Commission Directive long before the experiment was
implemented in Finland.
I observe prices before and after the VAT change for a sample of firms.
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Following the prices of individual services over the VAT cut enables me to
estimate precisely the consumption tax incidence. Moreover, the price infor-
mation is linked to firm level tax register data containing every firm liable
to taxation in Finland. The tax register data contain the quarterly turnover
and wage sums, and annual tax records containing income from the firm
(profits). The turnover of these small firms is the quantity of services sold
multiplied by their price. Observing the prices and turnover of the same firm
before and after the VAT reform allows me to estimate the extent to which
the equilibrium quantity changed as a response to the VAT cut. Observing
profits allows me to estimate which side of the market got the surplus from
the tax cut. Other tax record variables are useful for controlling the economic
circumstances firms face.
The results for prices indicate that hairdressers cut their prices by 6%,
half of what full pass-through implies. Larger firms reduced their prices
more often than smaller firms. There is an indication that the degree of
competition played a role, since there was more pass through on the prices
of regular services advertized on street billboards than on the prices of more
specialized and less visible products.
The results for the tax variables indicate a decline in the turnover of
larger firms, but none for the smaller firms. This is in line with the price
results for larger and smaller firms, the former reducing their prices more
than the latter. Turnover is the consumer price times the number of services
sold. Thus the price and turnover results together suggest that only the
price responded, and that mostly in larger firms, but the quantity part of
the turnover did not change in either group. An instrumental variables (IV)
estimate tests this hypothesis more formally. In the IV estimation the reform
is an instrument for changes in prices in the first stage. Instrumented price
changes explain the changes in the value of output in the second stage. The
result is that turnover changes by the same amount as prices, which again
suggests that the equilibrium quantity of services did not change.
The results for other outcomes nicely complete the analysis of the VAT
reform. The reform seems not to affect the wage sums of the treated firms.
This indicates that the firms did not hire more, or increase the wages of their
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existing employees. Instead, the reform increased the income, i.e. the profit,
of entrepreneurs in the treated firms. Smaller firms increased their profits
more than larger firms. This is again consistent with the heterogeneous price
response and non responsive equilibrium quantity. Those firms that reduced
their prices got less of the surplus from lower taxes than those that did not
lower their prices. The mechanism behind this result is that when the tax
inclusive price charged from customers does not increase by the implied full
pass through, the tax exclusive price the entrepreneur obtains is reduced.
This study contributes to the literature studying the impact and optimal-
ity of consumption taxes in two ways. Firstly, credible estimation of the effect
of consumption taxes on equilibrium quantity is challenging. This paper pro-
vides first quasi-experimental evidence on this. For policy implications this
is very important since knowing the effect on quantities allows this study to
shed new light on efficiency issues. The results here imply that the reduced
VAT rate did not affect the equilibrium quantity. This result in turn could
be explained by inelastic demand for the targeted services. In the Ramsey
(1927) consumption tax theory, inelastic demand makes increasing the con-
sumption tax rate, rather than decreasing it, more attractive. Moreover,
the analysis discusses the idea that inelastic demand for goods or services in
general affects the desirability of reduced VAT rates for these goods. In lit-
erature there are complementarity with labor supply (Saez 2002) and equity
arguments (Diamond and Mirrlees 1971) for reduced VAT rates, which, this
paper argues, do not empirically apply to hairdressing services.1
Secondly, this paper contributes to the literature by showing that con-
sumption taxes do not always fully shift to prices. The focus in this paper
is on service sector firms. There are not many studies focusing on this sec-
tor. Instead, Doyle and Samphantharak (2008) and Marion and Muehlegger
(2011) study gasoline tax incidence on prices. The overall finding seems to
be that these prices have a unit tax elasticity, although the pass-through
depends on economic conditions. It seems natural that tax incidence could
1There is no strong case for the complementarity of hairdressing services with labor
supply. Individuals do not spend large shares of their consumption budgets to hairdressing
services. Furthermore, hairdressing services are to some extent luxury goods, making the
equity reasons for lowering the VAT less compelling.
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vary by sector. Carbonnier (2007) confirms this by comparing two French
sectors, where VAT rate changed. He finds that the repair service sector VAT
has lower pass-through to prices than the car sales sector VAT, and neither
show full pass through. This result is much in line with the current study.
Other studies (Poterba 1996, Besley and Rosen 1999 and Alm, Sennoga and
Skidmore 2009) focus on sales tax incidence on various products utilizing
price indices and find generally full or over pass through to prices.
Section 2 describes the institutional background and discusses the an-
ticipated effect of lowering VAT. Section 3 presents the approach used to
analyze the effects of the reform. The data are described in section 4. Sec-
tion 5 presents and explains the results and section 6 concludes the study.
2 Design of the reform and anticipated effects
2.1 Institutional background and the reform
The European Union requires Member States to have a consumption tax sys-
tem based on value added taxes (VAT). A certain degree of harmonization is
required of individual Member States in setting their VAT rates (EC 2006a).
As an exception to their normal VAT rates, Member States are allowed to
experiment with reduced VAT rates for certain labor-intensive services. The
aim of the EU rules is to allow Member States to experiment whether re-
duced VAT rates can increase employment and reduce the shadow economy
in these services (EC 1999 and 2006b).
Finland reduced VAT on hairdressing services from 22% to 8% from the
beginning of 2007. The reduced rate was to remain in force until the end of
2010 (Finlex 2006). It was subsequently decided to abolish it at the end of
2011. The original EU directive (EC 1999) listed the services that are eligible
for reduced VAT rates. This list includes some labor-intensive services, but
leaves out others (such as beauty salons). There is a fine line in legislation
between a hairdressing and a beauty salon service. Performing a service for
hair is in the former category, but performing a service on an eyebrow is in
the latter category.
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The aim of both the EU directive and the Finnish government was to
increase economic activity within the targeted services. Thus the main argu-
ment for using reduced VAT rates was to boost employment in these service
sectors. This argument relies on there being an elastic equilibrium quantity
in these services. Reducing the VAT rate would then lead to a higher quan-
tity, to more services being sold. Since the services are labor intensive, it was
thought that increased output would lead to increased use of the main input,
labor.
Firms report to the Finnish tax authorities the VAT that they collect on
their everyday transactions. At the time of the reform, firms had to report
VAT to the tax authority once a month. They reported the monthly sum of
taxes separately by tax rate. Thus in 2006 hairdressers reported the amount
of taxes remitted at the 22% rate and in 2007 they reported taxes remitted
at the 8% rate on the same services sold. The same firm might also have
had other sales, such as selling out products, which continued to be at the
standard 22% rate. Thus the tax record of each firm shows the total amount
of taxes charged on sales at each VAT rate.
2.2 Predictions from economic theory
The competitive economy model provides the basic insights about the effect
of consumption taxes on prices and quantities. There the degree of shifting
depends on the elasticities of demand and supply. The more inelastic side of
the market bears the burden of taxation. If e.g. the supply is highly elas-
tic, as under the constant returns to scale assumption, the consumption tax
should pass through to the consumer price completely. Similarly, if demand
is inelastic, the tax shifts to the consumer price and the quantity traded
changes little. Higher tax leads to higher prices for consumers. On the other
hand, if demand is elastic, the equilibrium quantity reacts to tax changes.
In normal analysis the length of the investigation horizon matters. In
the short term supply could be more inelastic than in the long term. The
argument is that firms cannot react immediately, since there are frictions
preventing the amount of services they can supply. In this case reducing
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the consumption tax rate reduces consumer prices a little. This in turn
increases the profit margins of firms through higher producer prices. On the
other hand, such frictions no longer play such a large role in the longer term.
Then existing firms could expand their production and higher profits might
attract more entry to the market. Supply becomes more elastic and thus
prices come down more in the long than in the short run. Profits tend to
zero. The testable prediction from this theory is a higher entry rate following
consumption tax reductions.
It is conceivable that the industries in question are not fully competitive.
For instance, customers may want to visit the same hairdresser from habit or
in order to hear the latest rumors. It could also be that different hairdressers
provide services of different quality, but this is difficult to know beforehand.
Also, it is costly to search in these markets. Depending on the assumptions
the model for imperfect competition could take different forms. Imperfect
information and search costs could lead to monopolistic competition. Once
a customer finds a satisfying match, she is not likely to easily try another
hairdresser, even if the current hairdressers increases her prices.
If the competition is monopolistic or oligopoly, the effect of VAT on prices
and quantities differs from perfect competition (Anderson et al. 2001, Myles
1989 and Weyl and Fabinger 2013). The effect depends on the elasticities of
supply and demand, but also on the curvature of demand. This is because
in imperfectly competitive markets firms take into account the extent to
which demand changes in their pricing decisions. If demand is convex, there
is greater pass-through on prices than in the full competition model. On
the other hand, if demand is concave, the pass through will be less than in
full competition model. Thus, depending on the curvature of demand, the
model yields more or less pass through on prices than the full competition
model. A reduction in the VAT rate should increase the profits of imperfectly
competitive firms (Delipalla and Keen 1992), unless demand is very convex.
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2.3 Pass-through in formulas
In the VAT reform for labor-intensive services, the VAT rate was reduced
from 22% to 8%. The consumer price p comprises the producer price plus
the VAT. The proportional change in consumer prices (4) after the reform
is the amount by which the post reform price (pa) changed from pre reform
price (pb) relative to the pre reform price:
∆ =
pa − pb
pb
∗ 100 = x%
With full pass through to the consumer price p, the underlying producer price
φ does not change, only the VAT added to the producer price changes. In
this case the effect of the VAT reform on 4, using constant producer price
φ, is:
φ ∗ 1.22 = pb, φ ∗ 1.08 = pa
4 = φ(1.08− 1.22)
φ1.22
∗ 100 = −11.5%
Turnover (Y ) evaluated at the consumer price is the quantity of sales (Q)
multiplied by the consumer price (p): Y = Q ∗ p. Assuming no change in
demand and no change in consumer price, turnover would remain the same.
If nothing happens to demand, but prices decline, consumer price turnover
naturally declines as well. Regressing turnover against the reform indicator
reveals the effect the reform has on this joint variable. However, one cannot
separate between quantity and price effects from simply analyzing the value
of outputs.
To evaluate what happens to quantity, it would be ideal to know both
the quantity and price. The second best solution is to estimate the change
in quantity from changes in turnover and prices. The idea is to use the
definition of turnover, price times the quantity, to estimate what happens
to the underlying quantity. The price and quantity changes are separated
according to the following formula:
dln(p ∗Q(p))
dln(p)
=
dln(p)
dln(p)
+
dln(Q(p))
dln(p)
= 1 + η (1)
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where η is the price elasticity of demand.
With equation (1) it is possible to estimate the demand elasticity from
changes in the value of output using an exogenous change in prices. For
example, if the demand is inelastic, estimating the above equation produces
a result that is close to one, since η is close to zero. In the empirical data
there is the complication that the same firm produces many services, the
prices of which may change differently from each other.
3 Econometric method
This study utilizes a natural experimental approach. The VAT reform is
considered a naturally occurring shock from the point of view of the firms. I
compare their development with a comparison group that closely resembles
them. The VAT reform was targeted at hairdressers in Finland from the
beginning of 2007. The control group consists of beauty salons, day spas and
massage services.
I use a regression difference-in-differences (DD) method to estimate the
effect of the reform. I estimate the following equation for firm i and time t:
Yit = α+ β11(haird)i + β21(after)t + β31(hairdi ∗ aftert) + β4Xit + εit (2)
where 1(haird)i takes the value of one for hairdressers and zero otherwise,
1(after)t takes the value of one for 2007 onwards and zero otherwise and
1(hairdi ∗ aftert) is their interaction term. The variable 1(haird)i has the
subscript i indicating that most specifications have a fixed effect for each
firm. The coefficient of the interaction term, β3, is the estimated average
effect of the reform on the outcome Yit. The outcome is the logarithm of
either price, turnover or the wage sum, depending on the specification. X is
a vector of controls including flexible time trends in some specifications as
well as firm level control variables describing the location and the economic
behavior of a firm.
The DD approach identifies β3, the effect of the reform on the outcome of
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the treatment group, conditional on certain assumptions. The main assump-
tion is the parallel trends assumption. Parallel time trends in the treatment
and control groups indicates that the control group represents the counterfac-
tual for the treatment group in the absence of the reform. For institutional
reasons it is likely that the firms in the two groups resemble each other. Both
groups consist of small labor intensive services, which are for the beauty and
well being of their clients.
Empirically, an indication that this assumption is fulfilled is that the pre
treatment time trends between the two groups are parallel. Figure 1 compares
price indices in the treatment and control groups. The figure shows that both
groups seem to display parallel time trends before the reform and after the
treatment group has had time to respond to the reform. Moreover, figures 2
and 3 presents the consumer price turnover over time in the treatment and
control groups. Firms are divided according to their size into figure for larger
and figure for smaller firms. Turnover in the treatment and control groups
also seem to follow each other over time. Thus it seems that the two groups
can be compared to derive causal inference on the effectiveness of the reform.
Another important assumption is that the reform does not affect the
control group. This assumption might not hold if the reform induces more
demand for hairdressing services and consequently customers do not visit
beauty salons as often as they used to. This does not seem likely, since
although the two services are similar, they are different services. Hairdressing
is for hair and beauty salon services for eyebrows or nails, for example. Thus
even though the two groups are providing similar services, they do not provide
the same services, which reduces the direct competition between the two
groups. If there is a large effect on demand for hairdressing services, demand
for beauty salon services could fall through the income effect. Empirically,
figures 1, 2 and 3 do not indicate any clear effect for the control group at the
time of the reform.
Over time there could be more entry into the hairdressing industry. For
identification, entry poses a long term concern that does not directly invali-
date the short term estimate. However, potential entry effects make the long
and short term inferences different. To check for these effects, I compare the
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entry rates in the treatment and control groups before and after the reform.
The data stretch for three years after the reform. Long term typically refers
to longer periods than that, but some changes in extensive margin trends
should be visible on a three year time horizon, if entry is important in the
long run.
In the second part of the analysis I am interested in how changes in
prices can explain changes in turnover. The aim is to understand how price
affects demand for the services. Mathematically, this relationship is shown
in equation (1). Since the decision to reduce or not to reduce prices is made
by the firm, a simple regression between these two variables would not re-
veal the causal effect that price has on turnover. Even more fundamentally,
turnover is defined as price multiplied by quantity, and quantity is a function
of price. Thus by definition changes in prices affect turnover. To distinguish
the change in prices induced by the reform from other changes, I use an
instrumental variable (IV) strategy.
The IV procedure is first to estimate the effect of the reform on prices
and second to explain the change in turnover using the variation from the
first stage. In equations the estimation is:
pit = X
′pi10 + pi11Zit + ξ1it
Yit = X
′pi20 + pi21Zit + ξ2it
where X is a vector of covariates, Z is the instrument variable and ξ1 and ξ2
are the error terms. The instrumented effect of price on turnover is given by:
ρ =
pi21
pi11
where ρ is the reduced form coefficient (the effect of the VAT cut on turnover)
divided by the first stage coefficient (the effect of the VAT cut on prices).
This measures a similar effect as equation (1), but uses only the variation
induced by the VAT reform.
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The identification requirements for the IV procedure are largely the same
than for the DD approach, since I use the reform as an instrument. In
both approaches the reform needs to be exogenous to turnover and price
changes. Additionally, the instrument needs to be strong enough, and needs
to have enough predictive power towards price changes. The strength of the
instrument is an empirical question and is tested with the data. I present
the first stage coefficients and an F-test value together with the IV results.
4 Data and description
This study utilizes information from tax registers and surveys. The register
data come from the Finnish Tax Administration. The data include value
added tax (VAT) and wage sum information originally at a monthly level
for every firm liable to taxation in Finland. I aggregate the data to the
quarterly level to reduce the large seasonal variance in the data. The data
include reported VAT separately for each rate and also the VAT credited
against inputs. Additionally, the data set includes information about firm
accounts. They are on an annual level and include information about the
profits, costs and assets of each firm. The data cover the years from 2002
to 2009, although I eliminate 2002 from most of the analysis due to a data
quality problem.
The survey data contain the prices of services in the treatment and control
groups for individual firms. There are two separate surveys. The first was
conducted by Statistics Finland and consists of the data used to calculate the
official consumer price index. It contains time series observations from 2002
to mid-2009 for hairdressers, beauty salons and massage parlors. The number
of firms in these data is not very large. The second survey was collected by
the Finnish Consumer Agency for hairdressing services. It contains only two
time-observations, one before (October 2006) and one after (March 2007)
the reform. It contains the prices of every service offered by about 400
hairdressers. Since the surveys are not conducted every month, the price
data are at a quarter level in most of the analysis.
Table 1 gives the descriptive statistics for prices. The upper panel gives
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descriptive statistics for hairdressers in the treatment group and lower panel
for beauty salons and massage parlors in the control group. The information
is from pooled observations for the years 2002 to 2009 and the mean and
standard deviations are in euros. The number of firms corresponds to the
situation in the last quarter of 2006, just before the reform. The first price,
the composite price, is the one that is used in the regression analysis. It con-
tains haircutting and hairdressing prices for barbers and facial and massage
prices for beauty salons and massage parlors. It is a firm level composite of
the individual prices. The statistics for the treatment group are divided into
samples coming from Statistics Finland and the Finnish Consumer Agency.
The descriptive statistics reveal that the prices are in the same range. In
particular, haircutting prices and the massage prices the two samples are on
average fairly similar. Facial services are more expensive. Thus the composite
prices are on average higher in the control group than in the treatment group.
This does not represent an obstacle for the DD approach, since similar trends
over time are more important than level differences. Finally, the number of
firms is not large in either group.
Treatment
Statistics Finland Consumer Agency
Comp. price Haircut Hairdress Color Haircut Hairdress Color
Mean 27.67 23.50 31.55 55.92 23.95 31.04 38.32
SD 5.88 4.11 7.32 14.62 5.69 7.52 12.13
N 5356 3910 3916 3918 1305 1427 1381
N Firms 453 145 145 145 323 327 328
Control
Statistics Finland
Comp. price Facial Massage
Mean 43.04 51.95 23.74
SD 17.56 11.35 8.46
N 4143 1332 1441
N Firms 97 48 53
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for prices in the quarterly data
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Figure 1 shows the development of the composite price indices over time
in the treatment and control groups. The index is normalized to 100 in the
last quarter of 2006 in both groups. The vertical line shows the first month
of reduced VAT, January 2007. The figure shows that hairdressing prices
decline sharply at the time of the reform. The decline is about 5 to 7 index
points, clearly less than the 11.5 point decline that full pass through to prices
would be. There is no deviation in the control group prices from their overall
trend at the time of the reform. Moreover, the prices in the two groups follow
a similar trend before the reform. This indicates that the assumption about
the control group representing the counterfactual works.
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Figure 1: Treatment and control prices as an index over time
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the firm level tax information.
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The data are pooled for the years 2003 to 2009. All the monetary variables
are in euros. The table is divided into left and right panels according to
treatment group status. The statistics shown are mean, median, standard
deviation and number of observations. The table also shows the number of
firms in each group in the last quarter before the reform.
The statistics indicate that the two groups resemble each other. In some
cases the average value of the two groups is higher for the control group and
in some cases for the treatment group. Moreover, turnover, net assets and
rents have a larger median in the treatment group, although the mean is
smaller. This indicates a highly heterogeneous sample and a small number of
very large firms that increase the mean in the control group. The % partn.
variables describes the share of firms whose legal form is a corporation or
partnership. It is noticeable that the treatment group comprises less than
10% of these. The vast majority of hairdressers are sole proprietors. This
is a bit less common in the control group. Coinciding with this, only 14%
of firms in the treatment group have monthly turnover over 5000 euros on
average, as the % large variable shows. There are more of these large firms
in the control group (24%).
Figures 2 and 3 present the development of log consumer price turnover
in semi annual data. The figures are divided by the size of the firm. Larger
firms have an average monthly turnover of over 5000 euros, when pooling all
the years in the sample, and less than that in smaller firms. The larger firms
constitute about 15% of all hairdressers. The figures show that the larger
firms have less time series volatility than the smaller firms. Both figures
show the development of the average log turnover separately in both the
treatment and control groups and the difference between them semi annually.
The vertical line marks the reform.
The figures show that the larger barbers have a visible dip in their con-
sumer price turnover at the time of the reform. There is no dip in the control
group time series at the same time. Moreover, the two groups seem to fol-
low each other fairly well over time. This indicates that there might be a
treatment effect for larger firms, and that the two groups can be compared
in the DD analysis. The smaller firm series are messier. The two groups still
14
Treatment Control
Mean Med. SD N Mean Med. SD N
Turnover 4094 2692 26062 301842 5720 2165 15966 86296
Input 301 157 3681 299962 582 172 1851 85239
Wage sum 5526 2640 16155 19577 5606 3050 13885 10709
Income 14679 12214 16981 301842 12601 6285 22106 86296
Net asset 3736 1354 303837 301842 9557 416 110013 86296
Other cost 10475 7026 59484 284302 16578 8291 77707 77549
Rents 10339 2752 75777 235699 17232 2550 79720 60726
% partn. .095 0 .29 300861 .21 0 .4 85235
% large .14 0 .34 301320 .24 0 .43 85201
N firms 10454 3025
Note: The data are pooled for the years 2003 to 2009 and are quarterly. The monetary variables are in
euros. % partn. describes the share of partnerships and corporations and % large the share of firms with
an average monthly turnover over 5000 euros.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for the firm level variables in the quarterly
data
roughly follow each other over time. There does not seem to be any variation
in the treatment group series at the time of the reform. Thus for the majority
of hairdressers there does not seem to be any treatment effect on the value
of their sales.
Figure A2 in the Appendix presents the development of log income for
firms over time. The income statistics come from accounting data and are on
an annual level. The figure is constructed similarly to the figure for turnover.
The log income series shows a clear jump for the treatment group at the time
of the reform. The control group seems to develop more steadily and shows
no deviation from the overall trend at the time of the reform. The difference
in these series each year shows clearly how income in the treatment group
increases relative to the control group.
5 Results
This section presents the regression results. I utilize the natural experimen-
tal method by comparing Finnish hairdressers in the treatment group with
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Figure 3: The development of log turnover in smaller firms in the treatment
and control groups
beauty salons and other well being services in control group before and after
the VAT reduction for hairdressing services from the beginning of 2007. The
regression estimates are mostly differences-in-differences (DD) estimates fol-
lowed by a few instrumental variables estimates. The coefficient of interest is
a DD variable that takes the value of one for the treatment group after the
reform and zero otherwise. I run this regression against different outcomes
to get a full picture of what happened to the treatment group in the reform.
The previous section presented graphs comparing the development of these
outcomes over time in the two groups. These graphs confirm that the out-
comes develop in a similar manner over time in the absence of the reform,
and can thus be compared.
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5.1 Tax incidence results
The first outcome of interest is prices. Table 3 presents the differences-in-
differences (DD) estimates for log prices for the quarterly data. The depen-
dent variable is the log of composite price.
The results are organized as follows: columns (1) through (3) present the
actual DD estimates and column (4) a placebo estimate. Column (1) presents
a simple regression including only the after and DD indicators. Column (2)
adds to this time controls, a linear time trend for all and for the treatment
group and an indicator for the quarter of the year. Column (3) adds to
this firm specific controls, log input, net assets and income from the firm.
Note that the number of firms drops in this estimate from column (2), since
not all the price observations could be linked with firm account data. The
placebo estimate in column (4) pretends that the reform took place from the
beginning of 2004. The coefficient in the first row shows the DD estimate.
Since the outcome is in logarithmic form, the DD coefficient is the ef-
fect of the reform in log points (percentages). The DD result of -9.6% in
column (1) is higher than the other DD estimates, since the prices increase
over time, and the naive DD estimate does not take this into account. The
preferred estimates in columns (2) and (3) indicate that prices declined by
-5% to -6% as a response to the reform. This is roughly half of the the-
oretical full pass through of -11.5%. A Wald test indicates that this result
is significantly different from full pass through. Other than the overall time
trends, the estimates are not very sensitive to the additional controls. The
placebo estimate produces zero, increasing confidence in the causal inference.
Table A1 in the Appendix presents the mean impact for different hair-
dressing prices. These are simple before and after comparisons without a
control group. The results show that in particular perm prices fell by less
than the normal haircut price (standard price). The difference may result
from the different sample of firms offering these services and also from the
different nature of the service.
Graph A3 provides similar point estimates in graphical form. The esti-
mations are performed only on the price sample from the Finnish Consumer
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
DD DD DD Placebo
DD -0.096*** -0.051*** -0.06*** -0.011
(0.01) (0.009) (0.013) (0.012)
After 0.123*** -0.004 0.006 0.003
(0.009) (0.008) (0.012) (0.011)
Log input 0.008*** 0.003
(0.003) (0.003)
Net asset 1.05e-07** 5.45e-08
(4.44e-08) (4.03e-08)
Income -1.32e-08 -2.96e-08
(1.89e-08) (2.64e-08)
Time controls No Yes Yes Yes
N 7913 7913 5423 2940
R2 0.258 0.455 0.420 0.440
N firms 603 603 501 474
Table 3: DD results on log prices
Fixed effects regression results on log prices. The explanatory variables in column (1) are an indicator for
the after period and a DD indicator. Column (2) adds to this flexible time controls. Column (3) adds firm
account variables. Column (4) is a placebo estimate where the after period starts from the beginning of
2004. The flexible time controls used are a linear time trend, a linear time trend for the treatment group
and an indicator for the quarter of the year.
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Agency. This sample allows to compare different services in the same firms.
Thus the results reveal the differing pass through by type of service rather
than by type of firm. The graph shows that the standard price, i.e. haircut-
ting or a basic hairdressing service, declines less than the more specialized
color price. The perm price is somewhere in between in this estimate. More-
over, graph A1 presents the distribution of proportional changes in standard
and color prices before and after the reform. The distributions clearly show
that there are smaller reductions and more cases of no reductions in the color
price than in the standard price.
The standard price is something that is usually advertised in the street or
on a website. The price for coloring services usually depends on the type of
hair and the amount to be colored. Thus it usually is negotiated between the
customer and hairdresser and is less visible. The difference in pass through in
these different prices supports the hypothesis that at least some of the services
are imperfectly competitive. Firms are able to utilize imperfect information
about less visible and non standard services. It is more costly for customers
to search for a perfect match in for such services because of the imperfect
information about quality.
Another interesting feature about the prices is whether or not firms re-
duce their prices. Table 4 presents regression results for this. The dependent
variable is now an indicator for whether or not the composite price is reduced
by a certain amount at the time of the reform. The results are organized as
follows: columns (1) through (3) present the general DD results for differ-
ent amounts of price reductions. Column (4) investigates additionally the
interaction with larger firms. Column (5) presents a simple before and after
comparison for hairdressers interacted with their union status. Column (6)
presents a placebo estimate.
Column (1) indicates that slightly over half of the hairdressers reduced
their prices at least somewhat and column (2) that almost half reduced their
prices by at least 5%. Column (3) indicates that roughly a fifth of hairdressers
reduced their prices by at least 10%, close to full pass through. Thus there is
heterogeneity among hairdressers in the amount by which they reduced their
prices. Moreover, a substantial fraction of barbers did not reduce their prices
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at all, even though their VAT rate fell from 22% to 8%.
There seems to be more heterogeneity in the size of the firm (measured
by turnover) providing the services. One third of smaller firms reduced their
prices at least somewhat, and half of the larger firms did so.2 Moreover, firms
belonging to their representative union reduced their prices by 5%, clearly
more often than the rest of the firms.
The placebo estimate in this case produces a small coefficient, which is
weakly significant. This could indicate that some hairdressers may reduce
their prices in the normal state of the world at the turn of the year, or
have sales campaigns then. However, this coefficient is only one tenth of
the actual DD coefficient. Thus it does not create great concern for the
estimation approach used here. Similar results can be obtained for other non
reform years.
5.2 Results for turnover
The next interesting outcome is the value of services sold, i.e. turnover. This
outcome summarizes how pricing effects show up in the value of sales and
changes in the quantity of services. Table 5 shows the DD results for log
turnover evaluated at consumer prices in the quarterly data. Columns (1)
and (2) show the results for all firms without and with covariates. The firm
specific controls in column (2) are taken from the cost side of the profit and
loss calculation. The net assets of the firms are also used. The table presents
only the coefficient of rents, since that is the only statistically significant
variable in the regressions. Columns (3) and (4) present the results divided
by firm size into small and large firms. Column (5) presents results for
unionized hairdressers only compared to all control group firms.
The DD results in columns (1) and (2) for all firms in the sample show
the significance of flexible time controls. The simple estimate without other
covariates than indicators for after and the DD variables imply that there
was a significant reduction in consumer price turnover. However, when an
indicator for each quarter and a linear time trend for the treatment group
2Larger firms have at least 5000 euros turnover per month on average.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
4 < −0.5% 4 < −5% 4 < −10% 4 < −0.5% 4 < −5% 4 < −0.5%
Treat vs Treat vs Treat vs Treat vs Treat Placebo
contr. contr. contr. contr.
DD 0.54*** 0.4*** 0.23*** 0.35*** 0.06*
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03)
DD*large 0.17**
(0.07)
After -0.01 -0.01 -0.03* 0.08* 0.29*** 0.03*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02)
Log input -0.01
(0.01)
After*Union 0.26***
(0.06)
N 7584 7584 7584 5051 11539 3864
R2 0.552 0.405 0.235 0.569 0.377 0.092
N firms 555 555 555 452 447 254
Table 4: Results for the probability of reducing prices
Note: Fixed effects estimates on the probability of reducing prices. The dependent variable takes the
value of one when the price is reduced in the first quarter of 2007 and zero otherwise. Columns (1) to (4)
present the DD results for the probability of reducing prices by the percentage indicated by the second
row. Column (4) additionally presents an interaction result for large firms, where the sample is divided
by turnover size. Column (5) presents a before and after comparison for the treatment group only and
adds an interaction for whether or not a firm belongs to a representative union. Column (6) presents a
placebo estimate comparing the two groups before and after 2004. All the estimates are controlled for a
linear time trend, a linear time trend for the treatment group and an indicator for quarters of the year.
The robust standard errors are in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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are added, the result disappears.
Figures 2 and 3 indicate that there might be some effect on larger firms,
but not on smaller firms. Column (3) confirms that there is a roughly three
percent reduction in the turnover for larger firms. At the same time there
does not seem to be any significant effect for the majority of firms, the smaller
firms. This result is consistent with the price results and the fact that the
quantity of services did not change much as a response to the reform. The
price results indicate that larger firms reduced their prices more often. Al-
though on average the price reduction was more than 3%, this is consistent
with the turnover result, since not all the turnover of these firms comes from
hairdressing services. The turnover captures the value of all sales. For in-
stance, if the value of half of all services declines by 6%, the total value of
output declines by 3% without any change in the quantity of services.
Finally it is interesting that unionized firms reduced their consumer price
turnover more than others. This again coincides with them reducing their
prices more often. All these results indicate that there was heterogeneity in
the price response and the changes in the value of output reflect that. There
are no indications that the reduced prices resulted in more services being
sold.
Table A2 in the Appendix presents the placebo results for consumer price
turnover. The estimates pretend the reform took place from the beginning of
2005. All the different specifications yield no effects, giving more confidence
in the actual DD estimates. However, placing a mock reform at the beginning
of 2004 produces small positive (statistically significant) effects. This is not
worrying for the main estimates, since the effect is opposite from the main
estimate and data are missing for control group firms in the earlier years in
the turnover data.
The reduced form DD result for turnover suggests that there is not much
changes in the quantity of services. I attempt to test this more rigorously
by regressing log prices against log turnover. As equation (1) indicates, this
produces one plus the effect prices have on quantity, interpreted as demand
effect. The problem with straightforward estimation is that there could be
endogeneous reasons for price changes. To overcome that problem, I instru-
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All Divided Union
Simple Controls Large Small
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DD -0.056*** 0.016 -0.033** 0.024 -0.079**
(0.012) (0.011) (0.015) (0.015) (0.031)
After 0.129*** 0.078*** 0.174*** -0.007 -0.064**
(0.011) (0.016) (0.029) (0.020) (0.030)
Rents 0.335*** 0.429*** 0.322*** 0.564***
(0.008) (0.031) (0.009) (0.041)
Time controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 371,081 350,051 56,272 293,779 20,406
R2 0.009 0.119 0.247 0.106 0.187
N of firms 20,954 19,734 2,593 17,141 1,043
Note: Fixed effects regressions on the log of consumer price turnover in the quarterly data. The DD
indicator takes the value of one for hairdressers after the reform (2007 onwards) and zero otherwise. The
time-control variables are an indicator for each quarter and a linear time trend for the treatment group.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 5: DD results for turnover evaluated at consumer prices
ment the changes in prices with the DD indicator. This instrument depends
on the reform and its exogeneity is confirmed by the previous DD analysis.
Table 6 collects the IV estimation results. Column (1) presents a simple
IV estimate that does not control for firm specific factors or overall time
trends. Column (2) adds firm specific controls and a linear time trend. Col-
umn (3) adds a specific linear time trend for the treatment group and an
indicator for the quarter of the year. The first row presents the effect the log
price has on log turnover. The table also presents the first stage coefficient
and an F-test value in the bottom row.
The simple estimation in column (1) is close to zero. However, adding
simple controls in column (2) changes the coefficient dramatically to over one.
The preferred estimate in column (3) is very close to one. However, the small
number of observations makes these estimation results highly inaccurate and
all sorts of implied demand estimates could be included in the confidence
intervals. The instrument seems to be strong, as indicated by the significant
first stage and the F-test values. The inaccuracy comes from volatile turnover
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(1) (2) (3)
Log price 0.27 1.26* 0.97
(0.56) (0.72) (0.66)
After 0.066*** 0.06 0.053*
(0.022) (0.039) (0.031)
Log input 0.28*** 0.27***
(0.03) (0.03)
First stage -0.109*** -0.069*** -0.070***
(-10.66) (-5.45) (-5.46)
N 5683 4611 4611
N of firms 516 469 469
F value 113.57 29.71 29.8
Table 6: IV results for consumer price turnover
Note: Fixed effects instrumental variable regressions on log consumer price turnover. The instrumented
variable is log price and the instrument is the DD indicator. Column (1) has no other controls than those
shown, column (2) adds to this a linear time trend and firm controls, net assets, log inputs, income from
the firm and all costs. Column (3) adds a linear time trend for the treatment group. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
data in the second stage. The coefficient for price supports the view that price
changes alone drive the changes in output value, and not changes in demand
for the services. This result should be interpreted with caution because of
the inaccuracy, however.
5.3 Results for other variables
To give a full picture of how the VAT reform affected the firms, this section
presents the results for other outcomes.
The main motivation for the reform was to promote employment in the
service sectors. Since most hairdressers are sole proprietors, the turnover
statistics should capture the increase in their sales and thus the increased
work for the entrepreneurs. Some hairdressers also have employees. Thus
the next outcome of interest is what happens to them in the reform. The
quarterly wage bill of each firm should summarize this effect.
Table 7 collects the DD results for the log wage bill. Column (1) presents
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(1) (2) (3)
DD -0.056* 0.002 -0.013
(0.032) (0.030) (0.029)
After 0.230*** 0.110*** 0.055
(0.025) (0.035) (0.034)
Log rent 0.289***
(0.038)
Time controls No Yes Yes
N 28,966 28,966 27,862
R2 0.044 0.069 0.106
N of firms 1,752 1,752 1,652
Table 7: DD results on log wage bill
Note: Fixed effects regressions on the log of wage bills in quarterly data. Column (1) presents a plain DD
estimation and columns (2) and (3) add flexible time controls, an indicator for each quarter and a linear
time trend for the treatment group. Column (3) adds the log of rent costs in the firm. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
a simple estimate, column (2) adds time controls and column (3) adds firm
level covariates. The result in column (1) indicates a decline in the wage bill,
but this result disappears when the controls are added to the estimations.
The results in columns (2) and (3) indicate a fairly precise zero effect on
wage bills. Thus it seems that the reform did not succeed in increasing paid
employment in the hairdressing industry.
Thus far it seems that the reform reduced hairdressing prices somewhat,
but did not have much effect otherwise. However, since the VAT rate was
reduced quite significantly, the benefit should show up somewhere. To inves-
tigate the hypothesis that hairdressers increased their profits, table 8 presents
the DD results for log income from the firm.
Columns (1) and (2) are for all firms in the estimation sample and columns
(3) and (4) divide the sample into large and small firms. Column (5) presents
the placebo estimate. Column (1) presents again a simple estimate and
column (2) adds time controls and firm specific covariates. Adding the time
controls seems to increase the point estimate for the effect of the reform in
this case. The result in column (2) indicates a 14% increase in profits due
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to the reform. This is a very significant increase. The zero result from the
placebo estimate in column (5) again reinforces the causal interpretation of
the large result in column (2).
The divided sample results in columns (3) and (4) indicate that profits
increased proportionally more in smaller firms than in larger firms. This is an
interesting finding and coincides with the price and turnover results. Smaller
firms did not reduce their prices by very much. Thus they were left with
a potentially higher profit margin for each service sold. Total profits would
have declined if demand for the services had declined. However, the turnover
results indicate that this did not happen. Thus total profits in these firms
increased. Larger firms reduced their prices somewhat, and therefore the
profit margin from their services did not increase by as much as in smaller
firms. In fact, the result in column (3) is very weak and changing the controls
makes it occasionally insignificant altogether. In summary, smaller firms got
the extra welfare from the tax reform, but larger firms shifted part of that
to consumers.
I also present the DD results for the other firm account variables in the
annual data collected in table 9. Column (1) is for net assets, column (2) for
the log of total costs, column (3) the log of wealth in the firm and column
(4) the log of turnover in the annual data. Net assets are not in logarithmic
form, since the variable could potentially take a negative value. None of these
estimates provide anywhere near statistically significant results for the DD
indicator. This indicates that the marginal costs of producing the services did
not change as a response to the reform. Moreover, it seems that hairdressers
were unwilling to use their extra income to increase the wealth of their firm.
If anything, the net assets and wealth variables are negative.
The final outcome of interest is the effects on entry into the hairdressing
industry. It seems that hairdressers gained from the reform by increasing
their profits. A natural hypothesis follows that increased profits will attract
more firms to enter into this industry, and also less firms to exit from it,
since it is more profitable than before. Table 10 presents results testing this
hypothesis. The estimations are DD estimations on a balanced panel. If a
firm is observed in the data in any period, it is put in the data in all periods.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All All Large Small Placebo
DD 0.094*** 0.143*** 0.091* 0.172*** 0.033
(0.019) (0.028) (0.052) (0.034) (0.036)
Net assets 0.000** 0.000** 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log other cost 0.330*** 0.086*** 0.360***
(0.012) (0.031) (0.013)
Log rent 0.138*** 0.184*** 0.134***
(0.009) (0.033) (0.009)
After 0.197*** 0.221*** 0.258*** 0.246***
(0.018) (0.050) (0.038) (0.030)
N 86,226 79,485 12,765 66,720 46,047
R2 0.050 0.151 0.093 0.167 0.010
N of firms 18,865 17,644 2,511 15,133 14,899
Table 8: DD results for log income from firm
Note: Fixed effect regressions on log income from firm in yearly data. The DD indicator takes the value
of one for hairdressers after the reform (2007 onwards) and zero otherwise. In columns (2) to (5) time is
controlled with an indicator for each year and a linear time trend for the treatment group. Column (2)
adds an interaction with sole proprietors and year indicators. Columns (3) and (4) are divided into large
and small firms, where large firms have monthly turnover greater than 5000 euros. Column (5) presents
a placebo estimate that places a mock reform at the beginning of 2005. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Net assets Log all costs Log wealth Log turnover
DD -6,233 -0.017 -0.018 -0.016
(4,448) (0.018) (0.025) (0.017)
After 1,662 0.160*** 0.019 0.181***
(3,929) (0.024) (0.029) (0.023)
Net assets 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000)
N 99,497 93,200 84,401 97,321
R2 0.000 0.024 0.003 0.011
N of firms 21,103 19,817 18,252 20,670
Table 9: DD results on other outcomes
Note: Fixed effect regressions on other outcomes in yearly data. DD indicator takes the value of one
for hairdressers after the reform (2007 onwards) and zero otherwise. Net assets are in euros and other
outcomes in log form. All estimations are controlled with an indicator for each year and a linear time
trend for treatment group. Robust standard errors are in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The outcome takes zero and one values. Value one in the entry regression
is when a firm is first seen in the data. Value zero in the exit regression is
when a firm is last seen in the data.
The table presents the results so that the first column for each outcome
is a simple regression and the second column adds time controls. For both
entry and exit the simple regression is statistically significant, but disappears
with the time controls. All the coefficients are small, and the results can rule
out even a one percentage increase in entry or exit due to the reform. The
final observation period in the data is 2009, three years after the reform.
This is not a very long time, but if anything is about to happen on a longer
time horizon, we would expect also something to happen on a three year
horizon. In addition, the reform was intended to be temporary. This may
have discouraged entry in the hope of higher profits.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Entry Entry Exit Exit
DD effect -0.0084*** -0.0024 -0.0082*** -0.0014
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
N 648,340 648,340 648,340 648,340
R2 0.0004 0.0029 0.0017 0.0042
N of firms 23,155 23,155 23,155 23,155
Flexible time controls No Yes No Yes
Note: Fixed effects regressions on an indicator for entering in columns (1) and (2), and exiting in columns
(3) and (4) in quarterly data. The main variable of interest is a DD indicator having the value of one for
hairdressers after the reform and zero otherwise. The flexible time-control variables are an indicator for
each quarter, a linear time trend for the treatment group and a quadratic time trend for the treatment
group. Robust standard errors are in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 10: DD results for entry and exit
6 Conclusion
This paper studied the effect of a reduced VAT rate on various outcomes
for labor intensive services. To estimate the causal impact of the VAT rate
on prices and demand for the services, the estimations utilized a large VAT
reform for hairdressing services where the VAT rate was cut from 22% to
8%. EU legislation dictated that VAT could not be reduced for a very similar
group of firms, beauty salons, masseurs and other wellbeing services.
The analysis concentrated on the efficiency of consumption taxation in
these services. With regards to that, the first outcome of interest was prices.
The standard competitive economy model implies that the pass through to
prices is determined by the elasticities of demand and supply. The result in
this paper shows that prices were reduced by 5% to 6%. This is about half of
the full pass through of -11.5%. The standard competitive economy model
would produce this result if demand and supply are somewhat elastic, but
not fully inelastic or elastic.
The price results also revealed some heterogeneity in pass through. Larger
firms, those belonging to a representative union and some specific services
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had greater pass through than other groups. The results regarding the type of
service indicate some market power. Also, union members may have wanted
to show greater pass through for lobbying reasons. This is because VAT
reduction looks good in the public eye if there is a large pass through to
prices.
Many efficiency results relate to the responsiveness of equilibrium quantity
to changes in the tax rates. The results indicated that turnover, the value
of output, did not change much on average as a response to the reform.
However, larger firms, which reduced their prices more often than smaller
firms, experienced a decline in their output value. On the other hand, smaller
firms, which did not reduce their prices much, did not experience any such
decline in their output value. Since there are a lot of these smaller firms,
this explains the small average effect on turnover. These results indicate
that the number of services sold, the equilibrium quantity, was unresponsive
to the reform. To further pursue this, I estimated the effect prices have
on turnover. Changes in prices were instrumented with the reform indicator.
These estimates provided support for the hypothesis that only prices changed
as a response to the reform, not the quantity of services sold.
The turnover results indicated that the demand for hairdressing services
is rather inelastic. Inelastic demand together with the less than perfect pass
through is not consistent with the competitive economy model. In that model
inelastic demand would imply full pass through to prices. However, since the
pass through was only half of that, it seems that the competitive economy
model does not capture all the essential features of the hairdressing ser-
vice markets. Rather the results give support to an imperfectly competitive
model.
Many hairdressers did not reduce their prices even though they faced a
substantial reduction in the consumption taxes they remit to the government.
Furthermore it seems that the number of services they sold did not change
much. Employment in the sector did not change noticeably and there was
not increased entry due to the reform. Thus government seems to have lost
in tax revenues, but did not gain from higher employment in the sector. The
natural question after these results is, where did the money go? The results
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for profits, in the form of income from the firm, indicate that it was en-
trepreneurs who benefited from the tax reform. They seem to have increased
their profits by almost 15%. Moreover, the profit response was heterogeneous
across the treated firms. Larger firms did not increase their profits as much
as smaller firms. This coincides with the price results, larger firms reducing
their prices more often than smaller firms. Not lowering the consumer price
after a reduction in consumption taxes translates into an increase in the pro-
ducer price and therefore profit margins. Thus smaller firms took the whole
surplus from the lower tax rate, and the larger firms divided the surplus with
consumers.
The desirability to reduce consumption taxes depends on the responsive-
ness of the equilibrium quantity in different ways in different models. In the
Ramsey (1927) consumption tax model an elastic equilibrium quantity causes
consumption taxes to be distortive. Thus goods that are not responsive in
equilibrium quantities should face higher taxes than other goods. The very
inelastic demand for hairdressing services suggests that the VAT reduction
was not efficient policy. The same intuition follows even if one allows for
imperfectly competitive markets (Myles 1989 and Weyl and Fabinger 2013).
A similar reasoning was behind the original suggestion by the European
Commission to reduce the consumption tax rate for labor intensive service
sectors. The reasoning was that since the services are labor intensive, any
increase in the equilibrium quantity increases employment in that sector.
This reasoning relies on demand changing sufficiently as a response to tax
reductions. Since the tax cut did not increase the number of services sold,
these kinds of benefits were not attained. Instead, it seems that entrepreneurs
were able to utilize their market power and increase their profits.
Another aim in the European Commission directive to reduce the VAT
rate on these services was to reduce the shadow economy. The current study
does not have access to data that could directly reveal the effect of the reform
on the shadow economy. Despite that, the negligible response in visible
turnover suggests that there were no large gains from the reform in terms of
less shadow economy. On the contrary, a large increase in visible tax reports
would have implied significantly less shadow economy activity as a response
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to the reform.
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A Appendix
All the tables and figures are in this appendix.
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Note: The graph presents the distribution of proportional changes in prices before and after the reform.
Standard price is normal hairdressing service and color price is more specialized service.
Figure A1: Relative change in prices
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Figure A2: Log income over time in treatment and control groups
(1) (2) (3)
Advertise Color Perm
After -0.055*** -0.045*** -0.028***
(0.004) (0.007) (0.004)
Log input 0.007** 0.01 -0.003
(0.003) (0.008) (0.003)
Net asset 6.66e-08 1.22e-07*** -2.63e-07**
(5.12e-08) (3.74e-08) (1.20e-07)
N 4581 4489 1168
R2 0.307 0.299 0.173
N firms 454 442 297
Table A1: Difference results for different barber prices
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Figure A3: The price change by type of service
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All Large Small Lobby
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Placebo DD 0.019 0.017 0.015 0.027
(0.013) (0.015) (0.018) (0.030)
Placebo after 0.045*** 0.047** 0.217*** -0.044
(0.011) (0.019) (0.031) (0.028)
Rents 0.274*** 0.238*** 0.248*** 0.505***
(0.009) (0.033) (0.012) (0.051)
Time controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 239,012 37,321 155,914 13,996
R2 0.088 0.256 0.111 0.138
N of firms 16,845 2,274 12,048 890
Note: Fixed effects regressions on the log of consumer price turnover in quarter level data. Placebo DD
indicator takes value one for barbers after 2005 and zero otherwise. The flexible time-control variables
are an indicator for each quarter and a linear time trend for treatment group. Robust standard errors in
parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A2: Placebo DD results on consumer price turnover
40
Valtion taloudellinen tutkimuskeskus
Government Institute for Economic Research
P.O.Box 1279
FI-00101 Helsinki
Finland
ISBN 978-952-274-090-8 (PDF)
ISSN 1798-0291 (PDF)
